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SYSTEMS NEUROSCIENCE
In this article, we summarize key findings presented at the work-
shop with a focus on (1) biological evidence for a strong integration 
of perception and action in the brain and (2) the implications of 
closed action–perception loops for computational modeling. We 
also highlight some of the recurring themes that were presented 
and discussed at the workshop and conclude with a perspective on 
future challenges in the field.
Biological evidence for integration of perception 
and action in the Brain
Foundational anatomical and physiological studies have provided sub-
stantial evidence for the integration of motor and sensory functions 
in the brain (for a recent review, see Guillery and Sherman, 2011). 
Regarding the neuroanatomy of the thalamus and cortex, Guillery and 
Sherman have noted that most, if not all, ascending axons reaching the 
thalamus for relay to the cortex have collateral branches that innervate 
the spinal cord and motor nuclei of the brainstem (see Guillery, 2005). 
Similarly, those cortico-cortical connections that are relayed via higher-
order thalamic structures, such as the pulvinar nucleus, also branch to 
innervate brainstem motor nuclei. Guillery and Sherman thus hypoth-
esize that a significant portion of the driving inputs to thalamic relay 
nuclei are “efference copies” of motor instructions sent to subcortical 
motor centers, suggesting a more pervasive ambiguity between sensory 
and motor signals than has previously been acknowledged.
introduction
A widespread approach in biological, theoretical, and computational 
neuroscience has been to investigate and model sensory function of 
the brain in isolation from motor function, and vice-versa. At the 
same time, it is generally appreciated that sensory and motor process-
ing cannot be fully separated; indeed, recent findings in neuroscience 
suggest that the sensory and motor functions of the brain might be 
significantly more integrated than previously thought. The purpose 
of the workshop on Perception and Action, held in September 2010 at 
the Santa Fe Institute in Sante Fe, New Mexico, was to bring together 
a multidisciplinary group of researchers to discuss the extent and 
implications of action–perception integration in the brain.
The workshop was organized by Nihat Ay, Ray Guillery, Bruno 
Olshausen, Murray Sherman, and Fritz Sommer. In addition to the 
workshop organizers a diverse group of researchers spoke at the work-
shop: Ehud Ahissar, Josh Bongard, Andy Clark, Carol Colby, Ralf 
Der, Keyan Ghazi-Zahedi, Jeff Hawkins, Christopher Moore, Kevin 
O’Regan, Daniel Polani, Marc Sommer, and Naftali Tishby. The attend-
ance of graduate students and post-doctoral researchers, who are the 
authors of this article, was supported by travel grants from the Santa Fe 
Institute. A complete list of participants and presentations can be found 
on the conference web site: http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/events/workshops/
index.php/Perception_and_Action_-_an_Interdisciplinary_Approach_
to_Cognitive_Systems_Theory
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tor learning, computation, cognitive development, and biological 
evolution (Bongard et al., 2006). Bongard’s lab has designed and 
constructed robots capable of autonomously generating internal 
models for motor control through adaptive exploration of their 
own bodily sensorimotor contingencies. Experiments centered on 
the these robots have demonstrated that gradual changes to a sim-
ulated robot’s physical form across “developmental/ontogenetic” 
timescales can facilitate learning of sensorimotor contingencies by 
guiding the learning process along a gradual trajectory toward its 
mature state. Remarkably, by tying the learning process directly to 
exploration of the sensorimotor space, his robots demonstrated 
resilience to major morphological changes and were capable of 
relearning and adapting their internal self-models after drastic 
changes such as damage or loss of limbs.
To achieve an effective internal model, Bongard’s robots generate 
a set of “hypotheses” and then choose actions that yield differing 
expectations under those “hypotheses.” Thus, the actions of the 
robot determine the information it receives and uses to improve its 
internal model. This idea of action strategies determining the flow 
of information was reiterated frequently during the theoretical neu-
roscience and cognitive philosophy sessions of the workshop. Each 
researcher, however, presented different objectives in the regulation 
of information flow by action strategy. Andy Clark, for example, 
presented a unifying theory of the predictive brain, in which all 
of the brain’s operations can be understood as being optimized to 
reduce prediction error (Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2005). 
Ralf Der, in contrast, suggested that minimization of post-diction 
error, not prediction error, represents a fundamental objective of 
behavior (Hesse et al., 2009). Der presented simulated robots that 
learned to self-organize toward minimizing post-diction error, an 
objective that achieved homeokinesis and yielded a vast range of 
coherent and playful behaviors.
Nihat Ay and Keyan Ghazi-Zahedi integrated the themes of 
embodiment and control of information flow by suggesting that 
a learning agent can export much of its behavioral information to 
the external world (Der et al., 2008; Zahedi et al., 2010). Drawing 
from the field of Information Theory, they showed that maximiza-
tion of predictive information, the mutual information between 
past and future senses, yielded explorative behaviors across a vari-
ety of simulated robots. Interestingly, it has been shown that this 
principle of maximizing predictive information proposed by Ay 
is mathematically equivalent to the principle of minimization of 
post-diction error articulated by Der, thus tying together several 
information-theoretic approaches.
While the unified principle presented by Der, Ay, and Ghazi-
Zahedi operated on the information flow within a single model 
of the world and converged to a single optimal action strategy, 
Fritz Sommer, presenting work done in collaboration with Daniel 
Little, introduced a different principle that operated on the flow 
of information between changing internal models of the world. 
As Bongard’s robots choose actions that help them to distinguish 
between competing hypotheses, Sommer postulated that choosing 
action to maximize the expected gain in internal model accuracy 
was a fundamental feature of exploratory learning. Using value-
iteration to predict information gains multiple time steps into the 
future, he showed that embodied agents could achieve, under this 
objective function, efficient learning of the world dynamics (the 
“Efference Copies” (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950), or alter-
natively termed “Corollary Discharges” (Sperry, 1950), have long 
been hypothesized to establish sensorimotor contingencies in per-
ception (for review see, e.g., Poulet and Hedwig, 2007). While the 
work of Guillery and Sherman demonstrates the prominence of col-
lateral connections in the anatomy of motor and sensory pathways, 
it does not directly implicate these connections in the encoding 
of sensorimotor contingencies. Neurophysiological evidence for 
motor feedback in sensory processing can be found in the remap-
ping of visual receptive fields (RFs) across several visual and associa-
tion cortices. For example, during directed saccadic eye movement 
tasks, the spatial location of visual RFs of Frontal Eye Field (FEF) 
neurons have been demonstrated to shift, prior to saccade, to the 
projected post-saccadic target (Sommer and Wurtz, 2008). Building 
on these results, Marc Sommer presented evidence that the superior 
colliculus (SC), a brain stem nucleus known to play an impor-
tant role in the generation of eye movements, sends projections 
to the FEF via the mediodorsal (MD) thalamus. Consistent with 
the hypothesis that this SC–MD–FEF pathway may be carrying 
efference copies of saccade motor commands required for accurate 
spatial remapping of RFs in FEF, Sommer found that inactivation 
of the MD nucleus during behavioral tasks greatly diminishes such 
remapping (Crapse and Sommer, 2009). Carol Colby has reported 
that efference copy-based remapping is a widespread phenomenon 
in the visual system, occurring in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), 
V4, V3A, V2, and possibly even as early in the visual system as the 
primary visual cortex (V1; Berman and Colby, 2009). These results 
suggest that efference copies find widespread use throughout the 
cortex, including early visual cortices.
A clear example of the role of motor pathways in the repre-
sentation of external objects came from the lab of Ehud Ahissar. 
Analyzing the vibrissae system of rats and its role in object localiza-
tion, Ahissar showed how this inherently active sensory modality is 
anatomically organized to form a nested set of hierarchical feedback 
loops including sensory and motor circuitry of the brainstem, tha-
lamus, SC, and the cortex (Yu et al., 2006). His lab has provided 
behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that object localization 
is encoded in the steady-state activation of an entire sensory-motor 
loop pathway, with convergence emerging over approximately four 
whisking cycles (Knutsen and Ahissar, 2009). This demonstrates, 
for one sensory modality, the critical importance of putting motor 
action into perception.
implications of closed action-perception loops for 
computational modeling
Two common themes emerged with regard to the implications 
of action-perception loops for computational modeling. The first 
theme was how embodiment, the opportunities, and constraints 
imposed by an agent’s body on motor action and perception, 
can shape learning, and facilitate information processing (Pfeifer 
and Bongard, 2006). The second theme was that action strate-
gies, through their interaction with the external environment, 
can shape the flow of information being processed by an active, 
embodied agent.
Josh Bongard argued for an embodied approach to building 
robots that explicitly highlights the role of active motor exploration 
and morphological factors for aiding or scaffolding sensorimo-
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is, to what extent can the neural mechanisms of perception be 
understood free of its behavioral context? A lively debate arose at 
the conference around this issue. Arguing that actions are neces-
sary for perception, Kevin O’Regan proposed that perception arises 
only from identification of sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan, 
2010). In support of this hypothesis, he provided evidence that the 
perception of space and of color can both be explained as identifica-
tion of motor invariants of sensory inputs (Philipona et al., 2003; 
Philipona and O’Regan, 2006).
In contrast, Jeff Hawkins argued that much of perception can 
potentially be understood without direct consideration of actions. 
Toward this end, he presented Hierarchical Temporal Memory 
(HTM) networks, inspired by neocortical organization, that were 
capable of implementing temporal sequence learning, prediction, 
and causal inference all free of any behavioral context (George and 
Hawkins, 2009). While he acknowledged the potential informa-
tion content of actions, he argued that it did not fundamentally 
change the basic computational principles of the neocortex. Instead, 
Hawkins argued that the motor pathways are one of several means 
by which critical temporal information is transferred to the brain, 
thereby enhancing the information flow from sensory pathways. 
One conclusion to be drawn from Hawkins’ HTM network model 
is that sensorimotor interaction with the environment, is, strictly 
speaking, unnecessary for learning, perception, and prediction, 
because the temporal information required for such capacities is 
already included in the sequence of sensory events. Nevertheless, 
it remains an important open question whether HTM networks 
can accurately model information processing as it is performed 
by the neocortex.
future perspective: toward understanding action–
perception loops in the Brain
During the workshop, Ray Guillery pointed out that “frogs can 
catch flies,” to emphasize the important fact that the mammalian 
cortex evolved in the context of a brain that was already capable 
of closing the action–perception loop. This, along with Guillery’s 
demonstration that nearly all levels of sensory processing receive 
efferent motor commands, suggest that understanding the hierar-
chy of nested sensorimotor pathways present in the mammalian 
brain may provide valuable insights into their function. Studying 
how such loops integrate sensation and movement at the lowest 
level of the hierarchy, across diverse species, may therefore lead to 
an understanding of the foundations upon which more complex 
sensorimotor loops, and perhaps even higher level cognitive capaci-
ties, are built.
Goren Gordon suggested that the research lines presented at 
the workshop could be categorized along an action– perception–
prediction axis, and along an axis describing the degree of hier-
archical complexity. Under this framework, the biologically 
oriented presentations (e.g., Ahissar, Colby, Guillery, Sherman, 
M. Sommer, Colby), captured the hierarchical nature of action–
perception loops, yet lacked predictive capacities. On the other 
hand, the computational and theoretical models discussed in the 
workshop (e.g., Ay, Clark, Der, Ghazi-Zehadi, Polani, F. Sommer, 
Tishby, and O’Regan) were prediction-oriented, but failed to 
model more than a single instantiation of the action–perception 
loop. Hawkins’ HTM model was an exception that incorporated 
transition probabilities of a Controllable Markov Chain). He also 
demonstrated that this efficient learning allowed the agents to 
become better navigators of their world.
Daniel Polani further supported the primacy of Information 
Theory in modeling action-perception loops in the brain, arguing 
that Shannon information is the proper currency of brain function 
as it is measured in unitless bits and is coordinate-free. He showed 
that, for a given scenario, the total information to be gained or 
exploited is invariant, but its actual accumulation can be spread 
between sensors or over time. He further suggested that informa-
tion can measure not only the knowledge to be obtained about 
one’s external world (a gain) but also the complexity of the action 
strategy utilized to exploit the world (a cost). Incorporating this 
cost on decision-making, Polani defined relevant information as the 
minimal amount of information required to achieve a certain goal. 
In doing so, Polani effectively linked the emerging information-
theoretic approaches to the more classic studies of reinforcement 
learning. He also presented the concept of empowerment as an 
information-theoretic measure of the impact that an action choice 
has on the external world. In simulations, strategies for achieving 
high empowerment gave rise to unique behaviors driving agents 
toward critical states (such as a pendulum arm balancing in an 
unstable upright vertical position; Klyubin et al., 2008).
Concluding the conference, Naftali Tishby further attempted to 
unify Information Theory with value-seeking decision principles. 
Like Sommer, Tishby argued that information itself is a “value” 
and that actions can generate information across a wide range of 
timescales, from the immediate to the very distant future. In his 
words, “Life is exploiting the predictability of the environment.” 
Tishby however considered the value of information within the 
context of specific tasks. He suggested that action strategies should 
balance the increase of environmental predictability with the maxi-
mization of the objective value of a specific task. To that effect he 
offered a model that integrates information gain with externally 
defined value functions and formulated the “Info-Bellman” equa-
tion (Tishby and Polani, 2010), which is an extension of the iterative 
Bellman equation from the field of reinforcement learning.
Interestingly, when it comes to predicting and integrating value 
(defined by Information Theory) over time, these three researchers 
– Sommer, Polani, and Tishby – shared a common approach: By 
casting their respective objective functions in terms of the classic 
Bellman equations, they were able to use Control Theory to iden-
tify optimal action policies. Indeed, Tishby coined the term “Info-
Bellman” to emphasize how his approach merges Information 
Theory and Control Theory.
on the necessity of action in perception
As experimental neuroscientists provide increasing evidence for the 
integration of motor and sensory systems in the brains of both ver-
tebrates (see results described in the previous paragraphs, and many 
more examples such as: Liberman, 1996, 2010; Eliades and Wang, 
2003; Rauschecker, 2011; Scheich et al., 2011) and invertebrates 
(e.g., Chiappe et al., 2010; Haag et al., 2010; Maimon et al., 2010; 
Tang and Juusola, 2010), and as computational neuroscientists con-
tinue studying the theoretical benefits of directly incorporating 
actions into computational models of perception, a fundamental 
question remains: how inherent are actions in perception? That 
Gordon et al. Toward an integrated approach to perception and action
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 20 | 3
It can thus generate a prediction error, a concept discussed in the 
information-theoretic talks. Higher level forward models predict 
more complex states. An inverse model, on the other hand, receives 
a desired goal and generates a motor command that attempts to 
achieve that goal. It is equivalent to the policy described in rein-
forcement learning and to the anatomical motor regions. Lower 
inverse models serve as motor primitives for higher inverse models. 
The latter’s “motor command” (solid arrow) is then the activation 
of these primitives.
The concept of hierarchies or multiple nested loops, suggested 
by Ahissar and Hawkins, is represented in that lower loops send 
information to higher ones (dash-dot arrows), whereas the higher 
loops send goals or commands to the lower ones (solid arrows). 
Efference copies of motor commands from higher motor regions 
to lower ones, as suggested by Colby and M. Sommer, are repre-
sented by dotted arrows. Information sent from lower forward 
models to higher ones (dash-dot arrows) also travels via collaterals 
(dashed arrows) to motor regions, i.e., inverse models, and hence 
can be considered as efference copies as suggested by Guillery 
and Sherman.
As forward models are predictors, their output can correspond 
to the prediction error described by Ay, Clark, Polani, F. Sommer, 
and Tishby. They influence the policy regions, here described by 
the inverse models. Furthermore, changing the policy via the info-
Bellman equation per Tishby, empowerment per Polani, or infor-
mation-seeking exploration per Sommer, corresponds to modifying 
parameters of the inverse model.
Taken together, this hypothetical model corresponds to the con-
cept suggested by O’Regan and Ahissar, namely that perception is 
sensorimotor contingency, or convergence of sensorimotor loops.
open questions
The conference was a step toward bridging disciplines that are 
divided in their conceptual frameworks and methodologies, yet 
many open questions remain. In particular, substantial discussion 
revolved around how an understanding of the relationship between 
action and perception can inform and constrain (1) experimental 
design in sensory and motor neuroscience, (2) future theoreti-
cal work to model neural systems, and (3) the construction and 
design of intelligent machines. The breadth of these applications 
alerts us that common metrics must be developed in order to facili-
tate direct communication between these different fields. Here we 
briefly consider several other open questions, which we believe to 
be of critical importance.
•	 Is	action	required	for	perception?	O’Regan	suggested	that	per-
ception requires knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies for-
med through motor interaction with the environment, and that 
our perception of space is itself shaped by the potential actions 
one might perform in space. Tishby raised the contrasting pro-
position that perception lies in the hypothesis generation and 
testing done by information gain maximization and hence does 
not necessarily require motor action. Also in contrast stood 
Hawkins’ model for passively generating sequence-memories 
to learn prediction. Is passive exposure to temporally varying 
stimuli sufficient to produce a percept, or is voluntary action 
mandatory?
both a hierarchical structure and  predictive capabilities, but it did 
so while ignoring the role of actions in prediction and perception. 
Intriguingly, a multi-hierarchical action–perception–prediction 
model remains to be explored in both the biological and compu-
tational communities. Toward this goal, empirical data are needed 
regarding the neural substrates underlying the predictive capacities 
posited by computational and information-theoretic models, as 
are testable hypotheses generated in action–perception–prediction 
models implementing the hierarchical architecture observed by 
empirical studies.
unification and progression
The hypothetical model outlined in Figure 1 is an attempt to inte-
grate the major themes and concepts presented at the conference. It 
provides a framework to consolidate some of the key insights: the 
basic constituents are forward and inverse models (Shadmehr and 
Krakauer, 2008). A forward model receives the current state and 
an efference copy of an action and predicts the subsequent state. 
Figure 1 | A hypothetical model of hierarchical action–perception loops. 
Forward models receive the current state (dash-dot arrows) and an efference 
copy (dotted arrows) from lower loops and send their predicted state to higher 
loops; inverse models receive a copy of the current state (dashed arrows) and 
the goal state (solid arrows) from higher loops and send the motor command 
to lower loops. The same model can also be interpreted in a different manner: 
higher motor regions (inverse models) send motor commands (solid arrows) 
to lower motor regions and collateral efference copies (dotted arrows) to 
sensory regions (forward models). Lower sensory regions send predictions 
(dash-dot arrows) to higher areas and collateral motor commands (dashed 
arrows) to motor regions. Hence the ascending predictions (dash-dot arrows) 
can be viewed as efference copies of their collaterals (dashed arrows). The 
two views emphasize the inability to separate sensory/perception from motor/
action in such hierarchical loops.
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limited systems will result in findings that are relevant to the full 
system of interest. We believe that sensory and motor functions 
are highly interdependent, that the brain is a complex network 
of interconnected circuits, and that embodiment is vital to inte-
raction with the environment. These beliefs stand in contrast to 
the approximations made in most conventional lines of study. 
Perhaps collaboration across disciplines and generations of 
researchers can push our studies closer to real, intricate, com-
plex phenomena.
We believe that the interaction between experimental-, 
 computational-, and robotic-oriented researchers can facili-
tate the understanding of brain function. Roboticists have 
used inspiration from neurobiological systems to construct 
complex controllers for embodied agents. How might their 
insights inform neurobiological experiments? Experimental 
neuroanatomy and neurophysiology have provided evidence of 
sensorimotor loops and efference copies throughout the brain. 
Can these findings further inform theoreticians about how to 
model closed action–perception loops? Theoreticians have pro-
posed several elegant models of action–perception–prediction 
loops as the basis of animal behaviors. With more regular dia-
log, could theoretical models be formulated to generate testable 
experimental predictions?
The recent workshop on Perception and Action at the Santa 
Fe Institute has awakened a welcome dialog between researchers 
from a variety of disciplines, and has emphasized the important 
interplay between perception and action. Many open questions still 
remain, and the field will undoubtedly benefit from further col-
laboration between these different disciplines, and possibly others. 
In our view, the defining accomplishment of the meeting was to 
initiate interdisciplinary discussion among modelers, roboticists, 
and experimental neuroscientists, and to identify questions and 
themes for future exploration.
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conference weBsite links
http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/events/workshops/index.php/Perception_
and_Action_-_an_Interdisciplinary_Approach_to_Cognitive_
Systems_Theory
•	 When	 are	 sensory	 and	 motor	 signals	 no	 longer	 distinct?	
Guillery hypothesized that thalamic inputs to all cortical 
areas carry efference copies of motor commands intertwi-
ned with sensory information from receptors. O’Regan sug-
gested perception might be the enactment of sensorimotor 
contingencies.
•	 Which	timescales	are	relevant	for	the	integration	of	action	and	
perception? Ahissar proposed that perception in whisking rats 
arises after four whisking cycles, i.e., after several hundred mil-
liseconds. Bongard suggested that ontogenetic timescales are 
required to build the infrastructure for action–perception loops 
How much does our perception depend on the active expe-
rience of evolutionary ancestors (phylogenetic timescale), and 
how much does it depend on the experience of an individual 
(ontogenetic timescale)?
•	 Is	 the	 relationship	between	Action	and	Perception	 invariable?	
There are actions that could be considered “directly mapped,” 
such as a hand movement whose direction is based on the sen-
sed location of a target such as a coin. However, there are also 
responses that could be considered “symbolically mapped,” 
such as a hand movement whose direction is tied to the sensed 
symbolic value of coin (e.g., left movement if it is heads, right 
movement if it is tails). It is known that different brain areas 
are involved in the computation of different perceptual attri-
butes, such as location and identity for example (Mishkin and 
Ungerleider, 1982), and this might translate as differences in the 
brain areas involved in different kinds of responses (Goodale 
and Milner, 1992). The question arises if the same perceptual 
and motor contingencies apply for directly vs. symbolically 
mapped responses.
•	 Is	 prediction	 central	 to	 the	 action–perception	 framework?	
Clark proposed this explicitly, and many others tacitly argued 
for this idea. Prediction, predictive coding/remapping (“future 
response fields” per Colby and Sommer), and predictive infor-
mation figured prominently in many of the theoretical models, 
especially those incorporating considerations from Markov 
Decision theory (Ay, Ghazi-Zahedi, Polani, Tishby, F. Sommer), 
and in robotics (Bongard). What are the neural correlates of 
these predictive mathematical constructs?
•	 What	are	the	implications	of	embodiment	on	action	and	per-
ception? Polani showed that the Acrobot, a two-degrees-of-
freedom simulated robotic arm driven only by empowerment, 
reaches the uniquely unstable inverted point, often defined 
as the goal for optimal control problems. O’Regan presented 
a mathematical model able to learn the dimensionality of real 
space only by finding a unique compensable subspace within 
the highly dimensional sensorimotor manifold (Philipona 
et al., 2003). This suggests that sensorimotor contingencies can 
teach the agent about physical space. Can a generalized relation-
ship between information-driven sensorimotor contingencies 
and embodiment be formulated?
•	 How	much	can	be	learned	from	constrained	experiments	and	
simplified simulations? Experimental studies of the mam-
malian brain often rely on reduced preparations or unnatu-
rally constrained behavior. Likewise, theoretical treatments 
and computational simulations often make many simplifying 
assumptions. In both cases, the hope is that careful study of 
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